Bergsonian intuition
As theorised by the philosopher Henri Bergson, intuition is a way of knowing that combines cognitive and sensory data to connect us viscerally with change as it unfolds.
Unlike analysis, which reduces objects to ‘elements already known’, Bergsonian intuition is a form of immersive engagement with the world which connects us with ‘what is unique’ and ‘consequently inexpressible’ in an object (Bergson, [1903]1912: 7).
Given that both we and the objects we encounter are never static but rather always moving and becoming, intuition is, for Bergson, primarily about the experience of duration, process, and transformation. It allows us to inhabit, if only fleetingly, the ‘continuous flux’ beneath the ‘sharply cut crystals’ of analytical thought (Bergson, [1903]1912: 3).
While Bergson aligns intuition with the capacity for sensing, he departs from the philosophy Immanual Kant, who he contends pours ‘the whole of possible experience into pre-existing moulds’ ([1903]1912: 85).
In both Bergson’s writing and Gilles Deleuze’s later account of ‘Bergsonism’, intuition brings together ‘experience and experiment’ (Seigworth, 2006: 118) to produce speculative knowledge about new and specific problems as they unfold in time.
Although Bergsonian intuition may seem to require embodied experience which eschews the distancing effect of technological mediation, Bergson’s method of intuition focuses on the specificity of experience ‘for the explicit purpose of going beyond the “turn of experience” to explore that which conditions it’ (Lundy, 2018: 40).